

# **Towards A Terror Free Tomorrow**

*The Importance of a Support Base to Global Terrorists*

*A White Paper By*



**TERROR FREE  
TOMORROW**

**BUILDING A NEW STRATEGIC  
FRAMEWORK TO DEFEAT  
GLOBAL TERRORISTS**

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## **Towards A Terror Free Tomorrow** *The Importance of a Support Base to Global Terrorists*

### **Executive Summary: Prioritizing the Pyramid**

The United States must pursue a new strategic framework in the war on terrorism. Our priority must become dismantling the support base for Al Qaeda and other terrorists of global reach.

Since 9/11, a widespread support base has transformed Al Qaeda into a global insurgency with many allies. The support base that enables Al Qaeda and its allies works as a pyramid. Its foundation is public opinion, which feeds the passive sympathizers at the next level, and active supporters above them. The sympathizers and supporters act as the movement's force multiplier, from which actual operatives and the leaders at the top rely.

A robust support base empowers Al Qaeda and its allies by providing new recruits and funding, hindering the ability to obtain vital intelligence, and inhibiting the willingness of foreign governments to act effectively against them. Weakening the support base at its foundation and lower levels will strengthen the military and law enforcement ability to eradicate the terrorists themselves at the top.

**Terror Free Tomorrow** is the only organization focused on a critical unmet need in the war on terrorism: advocating a strategic framework to address the support base that empowers Al Qaeda and its allies. If the United States approaches global terrorism through a new prism of weakening each level of its support base, we can isolate the terrorists, and strengthen our long-term likelihood to prevail against them.

# **Towards A Terror Free Tomorrow**

## ***The Importance of a Support Base to Global Terrorists***

### **Introduction**

Mamoun Fandy, columnist for the leading Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, testified before the 9/11 Commission:

“Although we seem to understand the formal structure of al Qaeda, we have yet to grasp the broader context and the forces that make such organizations appealing to many people in the Muslim world, from which al Qaeda and its affiliate organizations draw their support and new recruits.”<sup>1</sup>

The work of **Terror Free Tomorrow** is to help grasp the broader context of support that enables Al Qaeda and other terrorists of global reach. If we can better understand the factors that empower the terrorists, we can be in a better position to defeat them.

We begin the discussion that follows with a brief overview of the increasingly lethal nature of the terrorist threat, before examining the elements of the support base that now empowers the Al Qaeda movement.

### **Al Qaeda Is a Growing Threat**

According to the latest intelligence evidence, despite the capture of some key operatives. Al Qaeda itself is “reenergizing and bringing in new blood.”<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps even more significant, since 9/11, Al Qaeda has transformed itself into “a global movement” with autonomous but loosely allied or Qaeda-inspired smaller terrorist cells extending over 60 countries throughout the world.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Al Qaeda is much more than a specific organization. It now represents a movement of global insurgents with diverse goals and organizations, but one overarching enemy of America.<sup>4</sup> This widespread dispersal makes it even more difficult for the United States to attack, as the movement lacks any center of gravity.

In all, Al Qaeda and its allies, according to Robert Baer, an authoritative CIA veteran, have made themselves into “the most formidable terrorist coalition in history.”<sup>5</sup>

After 9/11, there can be little doubt of the increasingly lethal nature of Al Qaeda’s threat to Americans. Indeed, Al Qaeda’s spokesman specified exactly how they plan to kill “4 million Americans—2 million children—with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with fatal maladies.”<sup>6</sup>

Or as the leader of an allied terrorist group plainly announced to every American before a national television audience: "God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons."<sup>7</sup>

The Directors of the CIA, MI5 (British Intelligence), and a United Nations panel of international intelligence experts all agree that it is "only a matter of time" and "all but certain" that the Al Qaeda movement will use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons against innocent Americans, Europeans and even Muslims.<sup>8</sup>

As the 9/11 Commission explained:

"A nuclear bomb can be built with a relatively small amount of nuclear material... about the size of a grapefruit or an orange...that would fit in a van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993. Such a bomb would level Lower Manhattan."<sup>9</sup>

No wonder Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force General Richard Myers has stated that today's global terrorists represent "the most serious security challenge that the United States and its friends and allies around the world probably [have] ever faced."<sup>10</sup>

## **Defeating Al Qaeda By Dismantling Its Support Base**

Al Qaeda depends on a support base for its power. In the American war on global terrorism, we need to make weakening the support base for terrorists a strategic priority.

In the discussion that follows, we begin by looking at the nature of a support base for terrorists. We then examine how Al Qaeda's popular support base has been growing. The next section examines how a support base is critical to Al Qaeda and other terrorists.

### **A. The Nature and Strategic Importance of a Support Base for Terrorists**

Fundamental military doctrine recognizes that the key to defeating terrorists is to deny them their base of support.

According to the leaders of the American military: "Terrorist organizations...need a support structure."<sup>11</sup> This support base comprises active supporters who "do not actually commit violent acts but assist the terrorists by providing money, intelligence, legal or medical services and/or safe houses or forged documents."<sup>12</sup>

It also consists of passive sympathizers, either "sympathetic to the terrorists' cause," or who do not endorse their violent means but support their goals or facilitate them by simply agreeing with their anti-American stance.<sup>13</sup> The U.S. military

unambiguously states that this passive support is “extremely important “ to terrorists who must rely “on popular support to survive.”<sup>14</sup>


As U.S. Marines doctrine concludes:

“The true terrorist threat” is the terrorist organization’s “extended support base” that can both “influence global opinion and can facilitate the provision of financial, material or personnel support to the cause.”<sup>15</sup>

The Congressional Research Service’s foremost expert on terrorism, Audrey Kurth Cronin, concurs:

“Western governments must recognize that the tiny proportion of the population that ends up in terrorist cells cannot exist without the availability of broader sources of active or passive sympathy, resources, and support. Those avenues of sustenance are where the center of gravity for an effective response to the terrorist threat must reside.”<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, the best way to conceive of the support base for Al Qaeda and its allied network is as a pyramid. At the bottom is the base of public opinion. The next level comprises the passive sympathizers, who may or may not support the violent means of the terrorists but are generally sympathetic to their goals. Above them are the active supporters, who lend concrete aid through contributions, teaching, sanctuary or other logistical assistance. At the next level are the foot soldiers of the movement, who in certain cells and countries may undertake terrorist attacks on their own, without the direction of the actual Al Qaeda leadership. At the summit of the pyramid sit the hard-core leaders themselves.<sup>17</sup>



## B. Al Qaeda's Support Base Is Growing

From active recruits and supporters to growing passive support and anti-Americanism, Al Qaeda's support base at all five levels of the pyramid is growing.

The CIA has estimated the number of Al Qaeda terrorists at a massive global army of some 110,000 fighters.<sup>18</sup> Even more significant, this army can rely on a "significantly" higher number of supporters since 9/11 and, according to the CIA, on sympathizers of some 6 to 7 million people worldwide.<sup>19</sup> A prominent former National Security Council official has estimated that the level of sympathizers has grown even higher since 9/11, to number in the "tens of millions."<sup>20</sup>

As former CIA Director Tenet explained, Al Qaeda and its allies "draw on broad support networks, have wide appeal, and enjoy a growing sense of support from Muslims who are not necessarily supporters of terrorism."<sup>21</sup>

Public opinion polls show similar results. A British radio survey after 9/11 revealed that 98% of British Muslims under 45 years old would not fight for the United Kingdom, but 48% would fight for Bin Laden.<sup>22</sup> In Saudi Arabia, a poll showed that 95% of Saudis under 40 years old expressed sympathy with Bin Laden,<sup>23</sup> while even in moderate Indonesia, a survey conducted by an Indonesian newspaper demonstrated majority support behind Bin Laden.<sup>24</sup> As President Musharraf of Pakistan recently observed, Bin Laden enjoys "mass popularity" throughout the Muslim world.<sup>25</sup>

In comprehensive and rigorous polling conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2003, people spanning the entire arc of the Muslim world, from Morocco to Jordan to Indonesia, voiced more confidence in Bin Laden than President Bush, by significant margins.<sup>26</sup> In nuclear-armed Pakistan, for instance in 2004, 65% of the people have a favorable opinion of Bin Laden, while just 7% favorably view President Bush.<sup>27</sup>

According to Tenet, even if some people do not support terrorism, "the steady spread of Usama bin Laden's anti-U.S. sentiment ensures that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future."<sup>28</sup>

Indeed, the animating force behind this public sympathy stems in part from an exploding anti-Americanism. A State Department panel reported that Muslim "hostility toward the United States has reached shocking levels."<sup>29</sup> Or as Pew concluded: "The bottom has fallen out of support for America" throughout the Muslim world.<sup>30</sup>

In a recent poll conducted by Zogby International in June 2004, 98% of Egyptians, 94% of Saudis and 88% of Moroccans held unfavorable views of the United States.<sup>31</sup> Even in non-Arab Muslim countries, support for the U.S. has dropped from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Nigerian Muslims.<sup>32</sup>

### **C. The Critical Importance of a Support Base for Al Qaeda**

A support base has been one of the most critical factors in the success of terrorist organizations.

A study conducted by RAND for the U.S. Air Force establishes the link between a robust support base and the success, or failure, of terrorist organizations.<sup>33</sup>

The Shining Path in Peru was defeated principally because its support base had been undermined, in contrast to Hizballah in Lebanon:

“The Hizballah case is also noteworthy in that the group managed to avoid the rapid deterioration experienced by the Shining Path. A significant factor in its success was Hizballah’s ability to maintain its support base in southern Lebanon.... The key difference between the two is that Hizballah, wisely, placed a higher priority on maintaining its popular support base than did the Shining Path.”<sup>34</sup>

Similarly, the lack of a popular support base contributed to the demise of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the IRA in Northern Ireland.<sup>35</sup>

This recent history provides important markers to prevail against Al Qaeda. CIA National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia and former Deputy Chief of its Counterterrorist Center Paul Pillar notes three ways in which a popular support base is critical:

“First, popular sentiment constitutes part of the roots of terrorism. It affects the formation of terrorist groups, the willingness of people to join them, and the sympathy and support the constituent publics give to them. Second, it is part of the political environment that limits what foreign governments are willing to do in countering terrorism. And third, it affects the willingness of individuals to come forward and assist foreign authorities or the United States in catching terrorists or heading off planned terrorist operations.”<sup>36</sup>

Specifically, a support base now empowers the Al Qaeda movement and its allies throughout the world by:

1. Increasing the stream of new recruits and funds;
2. Hindering the ability to gain vital human intelligence and cooperation from an increasingly unsympathetic population; and
3. Weakening the will of local governments to act effectively against the terrorist network inside their borders, and cooperate with the U.S.

Indeed, Al Qaeda leaders themselves acknowledge the importance of a popular support base to their success.

### **1. A Support Base Leads to Increasing Recruits and Funds for Al Qaeda and Its Allies**

As former Senator and Co-Chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century Gary Hart has written:

“Of the three resources required by terrorists—money, weapons and people—the most vital one is people.”<sup>37</sup>

Unless we weaken the support base, we can never stem the increasing tide of people to the Al Qaeda cause.

“Recruitment pools,” according to RAND, “are one of the most important requirements for terrorist groups to survive over time.” Terrorist organizations “need new members both to grow in strength and to replenish losses.” In fact, recruitment can be so important that one study found that terrorists “conduct increasingly lethal attacks, in part, to gain more recruits.”<sup>38</sup>

Since 9/11, Al Qaeda’s increasing popular support—and intensifying anti-Americanism—has led to a growing stream of fresh recruits.

“I’ll be happy to die a martyr. After me, there will be a million Amrozis.”<sup>39</sup> These were the words of Amrozi, one of the plotters of the Bali bombings, after being sentenced to death by an Indonesian court.

Unfortunately, his chilling words seem almost prescient. New intelligence uncovered from Al Qaeda cells during the summer of 2004 demonstrates that despite the capture of some key operatives, Al Qaeda is “regenerating and bringing in new blood.”<sup>40</sup> Fresh recruits and new leaders have left Al Qaeda as strong, if not stronger, than ever.<sup>41</sup>

Indeed, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently acknowledged that the flood of new terrorist recruits “coming in the intake” and “being deployed and sent out to work the seams and the shadows” are increasing immeasurably.<sup>42</sup>

As Steven Emerson, a prominent counterterrorism expert, testified before the 9/11 Commission:

“Al Qaeda’s most serious challenge to international security lies in its ability to quickly replenish its ranks with dedicated operatives.”<sup>43</sup>

Al Qaeda’s fundraising is also advanced by increased popular support.



In fact, Al Qaeda has relied on fundraising as its primary source of financial support. The 9/11 Commission concluded that, "Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune.... Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network."<sup>44</sup>

At the same time Al Qaeda replenishes itself with new recruits and fundraising, more and more Muslim religious leaders, university academics, opinion makers and writers have taken up various aspects of the Al Qaeda cause.<sup>45</sup>

## **2. A Support Base Thwarts the Ability to Acquire Vital Human Intelligence from An Increasingly Unsympathetic Public**

One of the most important tools that the military, intelligence agencies and law enforcement use to acquire intelligence and capture or kill terrorists is the cooperation of a sympathetic public.

In the United States, the FBI has made gaining the support of our local Muslim communities a top counterterrorist priority.<sup>46</sup> In the United Kingdom, law enforcement authorities also recognize that "communities play a key role in containing terrorism, and their support is vital."<sup>47</sup> For the military as well, a supportive population can often be "the best source" of intelligence.<sup>48</sup>

The conclusion of CIA expert Paul Pillar is self-evident:

"The attitude of foreign publics...affects the willingness of individuals to come forward and assist foreign authorities or the United States in catching terrorists."<sup>49</sup>

In fact, as much as 90% of all leads on terrorists come from human and law enforcement-type sources such as public tips, witnesses, informants, and the cooperation of a supportive public.<sup>50</sup> Without a sympathetic population, cultivation of these human sources, either by American law enforcement, the CIA or perhaps most importantly, foreign intelligence and law enforcement, would dry up.

Indeed, intelligence experts are virtually unanimous that human intelligence must be "our top priority" and "the key to fighting a successful war on terrorism."<sup>51</sup>

As former Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe observed:

"Intelligence is crucial in any war, but it comes close to the defining factor in this campaign....The difficulty of finding a man or members of a shadowy organization that...works chiefly to hide in countries with sympathetic elements of the population cannot be overstated. The world is a haystack."<sup>52</sup>

According to a leading authority at the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute:

“The key to [al-Qaeda’s] defeat lies in the realms of intelligence and police work, with military forces playing an important but nonetheless supporting role. Beyond the military destruction of al-Qaeda’s training and planning base in Afghanistan, good intelligence—and luck—has formed the basis of virtually every other U.S. success against al-Qaeda.”<sup>53</sup>

**Item:** The capture of leading Al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed by the Pakistanis came from an informant.<sup>54</sup>

**Item:** Informants allowed the successful apprehension of the conspirators in the plot to blow up New York City landmarks, and the discovery of the conspiracy to explode propane and fuel storage tanks in California.<sup>55</sup>

**Item:** The arrest of Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing, was made possible by a timely tip.<sup>56</sup>

**Item:** The 2003 capture of Hambali, Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asia mastermind, resulted from a tip from suspicious neighbors, who informed Thai authorities who, in turn, called the CIA.<sup>57</sup>

As Graham Allison, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, concluded:

“Foreign nationals...can play a huge role in tracking down terrorists. If not, they become a sympathetic sea in which terrorists can swim and hide.”<sup>58</sup>

### **3. A Support Base Inhibits the Willingness of Local Governments to Act Effectively Against Terrorists**

Perhaps the most important aspect of a support base for terrorists—and lack of public support for the United States—is its impact on the willingness of local governments to act effectively against the terrorists.

Local governments know the terrain, culture and people and are often in a better position, if they chose to, than the United States to act against the terrorists operating from their countries.<sup>59</sup>

The key factor for effective action often rests on the popular support base the terrorists enjoy. These local regimes are “not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power.”<sup>60</sup> Because they are concerned about “inflaming public opinion,” their actions are frequently not as forceful against the terrorists and their support base as they could be.<sup>61</sup>

As Graham Fuller, former Vice-Chairman of the CIA’s National Intelligence Council, wrote:

“[T]he basic problem for all regimes remains: how do they cope with a movement that for the time being carries a greater measure of popular support than any other political force?”<sup>62</sup>

Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, explains:

“The first line of international defense must be in the countries of origin of the terrorists themselves. To strengthen these international defenses, you have to build the will for these countries to act. Building the will means essentially building political support...in which there is more community support for cracking down on terrorism.”<sup>63</sup>

In country after country on which the United States must rely, popular support for the Al Qaeda movement—and the lack of support for the United States—is a serious constraint on a local government’s ability and desire to act against the entire support base of the Al Qaeda movement.

As former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye has written:

“Take Pakistan for example. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more concessions in the mix.”<sup>64</sup>

In Pakistan, for the first time in the country’s history, an alliance of six major Islamist parties has won power in two provinces, basing their campaign largely on anti-American slogans.<sup>65</sup> As a result, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri has pointed out “the domestic fallout” to aggressive Pakistani actions against Al Qaeda cells and, just as critically, their supporters in these provinces.<sup>66</sup>

Governments throughout Asia indeed “face an increasing tension between their external commitments to support the United States and these internal views” supporting the Al Qaeda movement.<sup>67</sup>

According to General Maulani, the former chief of Indonesian intelligence:

“Everything that gives the impression that Indonesia is serving the American interest in its drive to fight terrorism will be opposed by the Indonesian legislature, the press, and the public.”<sup>68</sup>

Governments confront higher hurdles in the Arab world. According to the International Crisis Group, “no single factor has contributed more to undermining the status of Saudi rulers and strengthening the appeal of their radical opponents” than the Saudi government’s relationship with the United States.<sup>69</sup> In common with most Arabs.

“mainstream Saudi opinion regards the U.S. as an essentially hostile force, determined to subjugate Arabs and Muslims,” making it increasingly difficult for the government to mount a full-scale campaign against the support base for the Al Qaeda movement in the Kingdom.<sup>70</sup> And as another example, in Yemen, “widespread popular hostility toward the U.S. makes it difficult for the Yemeni government to cooperate openly” against Al Qaeda members.<sup>71</sup>

For former Deputy Attorney General of the United States Philip Heymann, one of America’s leading authorities on terrorism:

“The most important action that the United States can take to make its leverage effective [is to] reduce the threat of potentially violent or mass opposition to any government pursuing terrorists on U.S. behalf.”<sup>72</sup>

Heymann concludes that “a determined effort to persuade hostile populations that we do not want to be an enemy” is thus a “critical step, not because it is likely to reduce the number of potential terrorists to a safe number,” but because it is “likely to make it possible for a friendly state to do that.”<sup>73</sup>

A popular support base—and hostility toward the United States—can also hamper the capacity of governments to pursue effective international alliances against terrorists, in particular alliances with the United States.

According to FBI Director Mueller, “These [international] relationships will be the key to our success. There is no one nation, there is no one agency, there is no one institution that can fight crime and terrorism in this modern age alone.”<sup>74</sup>

“To get the global job done,” former CIA Director Tenet stated, “foreign governments will need to improve bi-lateral and multilateral, and even inter-service cooperation,” especially since other nations’ intelligence services often have better information than the United States.<sup>75</sup> The Jordanians and Pakistanis, for example, “definitely have informants inside the terror groups.”<sup>76</sup>

Yet perhaps the single greatest factor that inhibits full, open and vigorous international cooperation is popular antipathy toward America. “Skepticism and distrust among Muslims across the world about U.S. counterterrorist efforts have impeded international cooperation.”<sup>77</sup> Or as Fareed Zakaria stated, “being pro-American should not be a liability for our allies.”<sup>78</sup>

#### **4. Al Qaeda Leaders Themselves Acknowledge that a Support Base Is Critical**

An enabling support base is recognized by the leaders of terrorist organizations themselves as essential to their success.

Al Qaeda's own leaders have acknowledged they need a support base to survive. Osama Bin Laden, in his initial declaration of war against the United States, specifically calls for the "collective movement of the Muslim people" to "support them in every possible way with the necessary information, materials and arms," even all Muslim women "to carry out their role in boycotting American goods." Bin Laden goes on to state that "if "Muslims don't cooperate and support [Al Qaeda fighters], then, in effect, they are supplying the army of the enemy...and increasing the suffering of the Muslims."<sup>79</sup>

Indeed, the very name "*Al Qaeda*"—Arabic for "*The Base*" or "*The Base of a Pyramid*"<sup>80</sup>—echoes Bin Laden's call for all Muslims to be the support base for the Muslim fighters themselves to wage holy war against the United States. Al Qaeda therefore depends on the greater Muslim support base from which the terrorists will be "the vanguard of the Muslim nation."<sup>81</sup>

Bin Laden's top deputy and mentor, Ayman al Zawahiri, in December 2001 set forth the ideological basis for the Al Qaeda movement in *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*. In it, Zawahiri explains that it is the goal of Al Qaeda and its allies "to mobilize the widest support base possible" at every level, from fighters and "martyrs," to supporters and the broadest popular base from the Muslim masses themselves. As Zawahiri writes: "The jihadist movement must move toward the masses, defend their honor, prevent injustice and guide them along the path leading to victory." Zawahiri also specified that all terrorist actions "against Americans and Jews" must take place in a context that widens the support base, otherwise "the Muslim vanguard runs the risk of general indifference to the killing of its members, and of fighting a battle in which it confronts government authority alone."<sup>82</sup>

Indeed, the greatest victory of 9/11, according to Bin Laden, was its ability to attract more recruits, supporters and sympathizers to the cause.<sup>83</sup>

As Daniel Benjamin, a leading expert on terrorism and former director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council, concluded:

"More so than with any other terrorist group, Al Qaeda's public relations are directed toward potential sympathizers."<sup>84</sup>

Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski identifies Al Qaeda's fatal weakness:

"Social isolation eventually demoralizes some of the terrorists and exposes others to capture. [But] the actual elimination of terrorist organizations [occurs] only when they lose their social appeal."<sup>85</sup>

## **Conclusion**

A robust support base empowers global terrorists, allowing them carry out more attacks that cause greater harm. Just as the United States seeks to deprive terrorists of their state sponsors, an equal commitment is needed to deprive terrorists of their support base.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Mamoun Fandy, Testimony Before the 9/11 Commission (July 9, 2003). Professor Fandy is also a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

<sup>2</sup> David Johnson & David E. Sanger, "New Generation of Leaders Is Emerging for Al Qaeda," *The New York Times* (August 10, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2003: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing (March 9, 2004) at p. 1. See also Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (2002) at p. 1; *The Economist* (July 1, 2004), citing the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>4</sup> The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004), Executive Summary at p. 16: "The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force."

<sup>5</sup> Robert Baer, *See No Evil* (2002) at p. 269.

<sup>6</sup> Suleiman Abu Gheith, "In the Shadow of the Lances" excerpts published in the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), "Special Dispatch Series No. 388" (June 12, 2002).

<sup>7</sup> Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Pakistan's Harkat ul-Mujahideen on 60 Minutes II, CBS (October 15, 2000), quoted in Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004) at p. 70.

<sup>8</sup> George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2003: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing (March 9, 2004) at p. 5; Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of the British Security Services (MI5), in London, July 17, 2003, quoted in Rohan Gunaratna, Testimony Before the 9/11 Commission (July 9, 2003); Charles J. Hanley, "Experts say 'Dirty Bomb' Attack Likely," *Associated Press* (June 19, 2004); *Associated Press*, "U.N. Report: Efforts to Hurt al-Qaida Failing" (November 15, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) at p. 380.

<sup>10</sup> See Jim Garamone, "Myers Says Terrorism May Be Greatest Threat U.S. Has Faced," *American Forces Press Service* (September 25, 2003). According to the 9/11 Commission, "Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security for the United States." *The 9/11 Commission Report at p. 361.*

<sup>11</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism" (March 17, 1998) at p. II-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at p. II-8.

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*; George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2003: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing (March 9, 2004) at p.3.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism" (March 17, 1998) at p. II-8.

<sup>15</sup> Department of the Navy, "Small Wars" (Draft), M. W. Hagee, General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the U.S. Marines (January 2004) at pp. 18-19.

<sup>16</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* (Winter 2002/03) at p. 54. As Rohan Gunaratna, one of the leading authorities on Al Qaeda, testified before the 9/11 Commission: "No terrorist group can continue, can sustain, without a flow of support. These terrorist organizations are continuing to grow like companies. They're growing because there is support....If you disrupt public support for these movements, these movements will die." Rohan Gunaratna, Testimony Before the 9/11 Commission (July 9, 2003). Or as General Wesley Clark succinctly concluded: "The way to beat terrorists [is] to take away their public support." Gen. Wesley A. Clark, *Winning Modern Wars* (2003) at p. 131.

<sup>17</sup> As Rohan Gunaratna again explained: "The key to fighting Al Qaeda effectively is to engage both the military organization and the support base....But the key to strategically weakening the group is to erode the fledgling support base--to wean away its supporters and potential supporters." Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (2002) at p. 314. Similarly, RAND experts concurred that Al Qaeda and its allied organizations extend beyond strictly the organizations themselves to an entire

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support base or “al Qaeda system, which comprises leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians and other facilitators, foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population segments, and religious or otherwise ideological figures.” Paul K. Davis & Brian Michael Jenkins, “Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism,” RAND Corporation (2002) at p. xi (emphasis in original).

<sup>18</sup> Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God* (2003) at p. 260 & accompanying footnote 76 at p. 350. One team of researchers found that there are 100,000 to 300,000 trained terrorists in Pakistan alone. Mariam Abou Zahab & Oliver Roy, *Islamist Networks* (2004) at p. 39. Another expert estimated the number at 200,000 in Pakistan. Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (2004) at p. 83. The International Institute for Strategic Studies cited conservative intelligence estimates that Al Qaeda itself has more than 18,000 foot soldiers. See BBC News, “Al-Qaeda ‘spurred on’ by Iraq war” (May 25, 2004).

<sup>19</sup> Quoting Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism for Presidents Clinton and Bush, in Tom Allard & Cynthia Banham, “Terrorism’s causes need exploring,” *The Sydney Morning Herald* (September 22, 2004). For the number of sympathizers, see Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God* (2003) at p. 260 & accompanying footnote 76 at p. 350.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Benjamin, “Remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations” (June 29, 2004). In fact, other numbers confirm these estimates. In Pakistan, one demonstration alone drew a million and a half protesters. See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America* (2003) at p. 200. Even in American-liberated Kuwait, recent elections resulted in “Islamic fundamentalists hostile to the United States sweeping pro-American liberals.” Peter Bergen, “The Deadly Shape of Things to Come,” *The Washington Post* (August 20, 2003).

<sup>21</sup> George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, written statement for record before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (March 24, 2004).

<sup>22</sup> Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America* (2003) at p. 213.

<sup>23</sup> Poll cited in Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris* (2004) at p. 72.

<sup>24</sup> Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia* (2003) at p. 24.

<sup>25</sup> Interview of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, “The Extremists Dislike Me,” *The Washington Post* (September 26, 2004).

<sup>26</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Views of a Changing World” (June 2003) at p. 3.

<sup>27</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “A Year After Iraq” (March 16, 2004) at p. 21. In Jordan, 55% were favorable of Bin Laden; 3% for Bush. In Morocco, 35% were favorable for Bin Laden; 8% for Bush.

<sup>28</sup> George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2003: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing (March 9, 2004) at p.3.

<sup>29</sup> Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim Worlds, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace” (October 1, 2003) at p. 15.

<sup>30</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Views of a Changing World” (June 2003) at p. 3. “Al Qaeda’s new trajectory of targeting the West won it significant support among the Muslim masses. Leaving aside the Muslim elite, ordinary Muslims worldwide view the West through the prism of anti-Americanism.” Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (2002) at p. 317.

<sup>31</sup> Dafna Linzer, “Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.,” *The Washington Post* (July 23, 2004).

<sup>32</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Views of a Changing World” (June 2003) at p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> Kim Cragin & Sara A. Daly, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat,” RAND Corporation (2004).

<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at p. 71.

<sup>35</sup> Marc Sageman *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004) at pp. 46-7, 63; Kim Cragin & Peter Chalk, “Terrorism and Development,” RAND Corporation (2003) at p. x; see also Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA* (2002) at pp. 378, 406, 408.

<sup>36</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2001) at p. 197.

<sup>37</sup> Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power* (2004) at p. 117.

<sup>38</sup> Kim Cragin & Sara A. Daly, “The Dynamic Terrorist Threat,” RAND Corporation (2004) at p. 34.

<sup>39</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “We Need to Get the Queen Bees,” *Newsweek* (December 1, 2003).



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- <sup>40</sup> David Johnson & David E. Sanger, "New Generation of Leaders Is Emerging for Al Qaeda," *The New York Times* (August 10, 2004).
- <sup>41</sup> Lt. Col. Echevarria of the U.S. Army found that Al Qaeda "has managed to create a substantial support base that may enable it to regenerate itself indefinitely." Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Globalization and the Nature of War," U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (March 2003) at p. 14.
- <sup>42</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Singapore (June 5, 2004).
- <sup>43</sup> Steven Emerson, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (July 9, 2003).
- <sup>44</sup> The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) at pp. 169-70.
- <sup>45</sup> In Pakistan, there are now over one million students in radical Islamist boarding schools. Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, Council on Foreign Relations (June 15, 2004) at pp. 21-22. And as Muhammad Amir Rana, a Pakistani expert, found "there is no doubt that madrassas have played an important role in providing manpower to jihadi organizations and most jihadi leaders are graduates of these madrassas." Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (2004) at p. 511; see also Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (2002) at p. 9.
- <sup>46</sup> FBI Director Robert Mueller explained: "The FBI needs the support of not just its law enforcement and intelligence partners; we need the support of every person within our borders." Robert S. Mueller III, Director of the FBI, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the American Muslim Council (June 28, 2002); see also David Johnson, "Fears of Attack," *The New York Times* (July 5, 2004).
- <sup>47</sup> Lindsay Clutterbank, "Law Enforcement" in Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes, Editors, *Attacking Terrorism* (2004) at p. 152. Mr. Clutterbank is Detective Chief Inspector, London police.
- <sup>48</sup> Leroy Thompson, *Counter-Insurgency Manual* (2002) at p. 171.
- <sup>49</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2001) at 197.
- <sup>50</sup> Michael Hopmeier & Boaz Ganor, "There are No Dangerous Weapons," *Journal of Homeland Security* (July 2003) at pp 12-13.
- <sup>51</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice* (2004) at p. 23; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Globalization and the Nature of War," U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (March 2003) at p. 15.
- <sup>52</sup> Clark Murdock & Walter Slocombe, "The Imperative To Prevail and the Nature of the Campaign," To Prevail, Center for Strategic & International Studies (2001) at p. 25.
- <sup>53</sup> Jeffrey Record, "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism," U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (December 2003) at p. 3.
- <sup>54</sup> Oliver Burkeman & Zaffar Abbas, "How Mobile Phones and an £18m Bribe Trapped 9/11 Mastermind," *The Guardian* (March 11, 2003).
- <sup>55</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, Remarks Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, RAND Corporation (March 31, 2003).
- <sup>56</sup> Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2001) at p. 198; also Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* (2003) at p. 25.
- <sup>57</sup> Graham Allison "How to Stop Nuclear Terror," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2004) at p. 69.
- <sup>58</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>59</sup> "The CIA, FBI, and the U.S. military can never be as good as the Taliban (had it wanted to be), or Saudi Arabia or Sudan before it, in dealing with Osama bin Laden. The Mossad and the Israeli Defense Force—as tough and competent as they may be—can never be as effective as the Palestinian Authority in cracking down on the fanatics of Hamas and other extremist groups. Neither the Indians nor anyone else can possibly be as good as the Pakistani government and military in curbing, if they chose to, the terrorist fanaticism that continues to tear apart Kashmir." Gareth Evans, "Building International Defenses against Terrorism," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Winter/Spring 2002) at p. 132.
- <sup>60</sup> Christopher Layne, "Offshore Balancing Revisited" in *What does the world want from America?* (2002) at p. 182.
- <sup>61</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>62</sup> Graham E. Fuller, *Future of Political Islam* (2004) at p. 168.
- <sup>63</sup> Gareth Evans, "International Responses to Islamist Extremism," Remarks to National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) Colloquium, Tokyo; see also Gareth Evans, "Confronting the Challenge

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of Terrorism: International Relations after 9/11,” Cohen Lecture in International Relations, Lehigh University.

<sup>64</sup> Joseph Nye, Jr., *Soft Power* (2004) at p. 129.

<sup>65</sup> Alfred Stepan & Aqil Shah, “Pakistan’s Real Bulwark” *The Washington Post* (May 5, 2004); International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military” (March 20, 2003) at p. 1; see also Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (2004) at p. 71.

<sup>66</sup> John B. Judis, Spencer Ackerman & Massoud Ansari, “Pakistan for Bush. July Surprise?” *The New Republic* (July 19, 2004). According to a senior Pakistani intelligence official, the Pakistani government has “limited room to maneuver against domestic extremists, given the depth of public anger over U.S. policy...” John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Losing Grip on Extremists,” *The Washington Post* (August 29, 2004).

<sup>67</sup> Simon S.C. Tay, “Asia and the United States after 9/11,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (Winter 2004) at p. 123.

<sup>68</sup> Lawrence Pintak, “Appearances & Reality: The American Terror War in Indonesia,” *The Earth Times Magazine* (March 2002); see also Simon S.C. Tay, “Asia and the United States after 9/11,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (Winter 2004) at p. 120.

<sup>69</sup> International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?” (July 2004) at pp.23, 27-8.

<sup>70</sup> *Id.*

<sup>71</sup> International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Coping with Terrorism” (January 8, 2003) at p. 24

<sup>72</sup> Philip Heymann, “Dealing with Terrorism after September 11, 2001: An Overview” in Arnold M. Howitt & Robyn L. Pangi, Editors, *Countering Terrorism* (2003) at pp. 60-61.

<sup>73</sup> *Id.*

<sup>74</sup> Robert Mueller, “Tomorrow’s FBI: A Vision for Meeting Future Challenges,” Council on Foreign Relations (June 22, 2004) (transcript).

<sup>75</sup> George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, written statement for record before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (March 24, 2004). As CIA expert and former head of its Near East division, Frank Anderson, explains: Only local law enforcement and intelligence services “have wide and deep involvement in the societies they serve and protect, and in which terrorists obtain recruits, resources and assistance. Developing the range of human sources required to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorist organizations requires such deep integration into the societies from which the terrorists arise and is, almost always, simply impossible for a foreign intelligence service, however efficient it might be.” Frank Anderson, “International Terrorism and International Cooperation” in *Countering Suicide Terrorism, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (2000) at p.50.

<sup>76</sup> Michael Cherkasky, *Forewarned* (2003) at p. 138-39. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledges: “Our regional partners are often better poised than the United States to gain access to information and intelligence.” White House, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” (February 2003) at p. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Paul E. Pillar, “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda” *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004) at p. 108.

<sup>78</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “The Arrogant Empire,” *Newsweek* (March 24, 2003).

<sup>79</sup> Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” *Al Quds Al Arabi* (August 1996); see [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa\\_1996.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html).

<sup>80</sup> Giles Foden, “War of the worlds,” *The Guardian* (August 24, 2002).

<sup>81</sup> Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” *Al Quds Al Arabi* (August 1996); see [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa\\_1996.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html); see also Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris* (2004) at pp. 131, 71-82.

<sup>82</sup> See Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds* (2004), quoting from Zawahiri at pp.73, 75-83, and 93-103. See also translation of “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner” at [http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman\\_bk.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman_bk.htm).

<sup>83</sup> According to Bin Laden: “[I]n Holland, at one of the centers, the number of people who accepted Islam during the days that followed the operations [of 9-11] were more than the people who accepted Islam in the last eleven years. I heard someone on Islamic radio who owns a school in America say: ‘We don’t have the time to keep up with the demands of those who are asking about Islamic books to learn more about Islam.’ This event made people think [about the true Islam], which benefited Islam greatly.”

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Osama Bin Laden, Transcript of Videotape made in November 2001, The Washington Post (December 14, 2001).

<sup>84</sup> Daniel Benjamin, "The Changing Face of Terrorism," To Prevail, Center for Strategic & International Studies (2001) at p. 46. Other terrorist leaders from Hamas to the IRA have also acknowledged the importance of a robust support base. For example, after the 1998 Omagh bombing and resulting outrage among its Catholic supporters, the Real IRA declared a ceasefire saying "As a direct result of the Omagh tragedy...all military operations have been suspended from 12 midnight." Real IRA, Press Release (August 18, 1998). "Hamas, like the Real IRA, views recruitment tools as a key organizational requirement and invests considerable time and resources in sustaining these pools." Kim Cragin & Sara A. Daly, "The Dynamic Terrorist Threat," RAND Corporation (2004) at pp. 35-36.

<sup>85</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice (2004) at pp. 29, 33.